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1. Introduction
Plan Colombia is a joint effort of the Colombian and the U.S. government to neutralize,
among other things, organized crime groups that control coca cultivation for illegal drug
production and trafficking in Colombia. Nevertheless, the literature offers no consensus on
the effectiveness of this joint strategy in successfully confronting these armed groups. On
the one hand, official reports by the Colombian authorities highlight significant reduction
in the number of kidnappings and terrorist attacks by 92% and 77% respectively as well
as a 56% decrease in the homicide rate since the implementation of the Plan Colombia in
2000 up to 2012 (Moreano, 2014). One of the strategic objectives of Plan Colombia sought
to reduce the cultivation, processing and distribution of narcotics by 50% by 2007. From
Figure 1 it is evident that since 2001 the number of coca leaf seizures have increased and
according to official figures the total cultivated hectares have sensibly decreased (UNODC,
2015). A number of authors have questioned the cost effectiveness of the plan and its exces-
sive toll on the local population (Mejia et al., 2015). The Plan Colombia is responsible for
the displacement of approximately 6 million people since the beginning of the program and
7 million since records began.
Additionally, the Plan Colombia has been associated with the proliferation of illegal
armed groups and drug trafficking in neighboring countries, particularly on the Ecuadorian
bordering provinces (FGE, 2014). Due to the Plan Colombia the intensification of the in-
ternal armed conflict intensified in the early years of the century. Consequently, Ecuador
has become the host of the largest refugee population in Latin America with an estimated
160,000 individuals requesting asylum since 2000, of which 98% are Colombian citizens (UN-
HCR, 2013). These people were quickly blamed by the local population as crime-prone. As a
result of these events, it has caused significant political and social upheaval and a widespread
feeling of insecurity in the Ecuadorian bordering regions with Colombia. Despite the impor-
tance of understanding the multidimensional impact the Plan Colombia has had in Ecuador
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Figure 1: Coca leaf seizures in Colombia from 1983 - 2013 (Thousands Kg)
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bordering provinces, there is a very limited number of studies that make an effort to address
these questions. In particular, we have not encountered in the literature any empirical work,
which attempts to assess the impact of the Plan Colombia on the incidence of violent crimes
in the bordering provinces of Ecuador with Colombia. This is the first work that aims to
draw any causal inferences on the topic.
In order to evaluate the Plan Colombia’s impact on violent crimes we use a difference
in difference approach. Particularly, we are interested in the incidence of violent crimes in
the bordering provinces of Ecuador with Colombia with respect to the all other provinces.
We measure violent crimes as the homicide rate in each Ecuadorean province. We are
aware that homicides is just one of the many conflict/violence-related variables but, unfor-
tunately, other measurements were not available nor reliable. In summary, we determined
that the Plan Colombia did not have any crime-increasing effect on the bordering provinces
of Ecuador. The results are robust to various specifications, such as considering averages
or growth murder rates, and different time periods. As a next step, we evaluate whether
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crime increased as migration soared. Given the likely endogeneity of the migration variable
(Bianchi et al., 2012), we are going to instrument it with a measure of the intensity of the
plan Colombia. The major concern with using such instrument is that the plan Colombia
violate the exclusion restriction because of the spillover effects in Ecuador, especially the
bordering provinces. However, as we have already anticipated, we do not find evidence of
increased homicide rates as a result of the implementation of the plan. The instrumental
variables analysis reveals that the idea that migrants leads to higher violence is not sup-
ported, as found by the recent literature on the topic (Bianchi et al., 2012). On the contrary,
our results indicate an overall reduction in the violent crime rate.
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 describe the Plan Colombia and Ecuador.
Section 3 presents the data, the econometric strategy and the results of the difference in
difference methodology. The following section assesses whether migration impacted on the
level of violence. Section 5 concludes.
2. Plan Colombia and its Spillover Effects in Ecuador
In a period of four years (1995 to 1999) Colombia became the biggest producer of coca
leaf in the world. The decline in coca leaf production in Peru and Bolivia together with
the increasing involvement of insurgents such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC)
and right-wing paramilitary groups the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) resulted
in an increase in coca bush production by 125 % during this period. As a consequence, in
September 1999 the governments of Colombia and the United States agreed to implement
a joint strategy in order to counteract the strengthening of illegal arm forces and surge in
violence and crime in the country. Thus, by November 1999 the Plan Colombia: Plan for
Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State (or Plan Colombia) was born. In
principle, the Plan Colombia was linked to security, economic development and ultimately
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to the peace process1. However, one of the main strategic objectives of Plan Colombia over
the period between 2001-2007 sought to reduce the cultivation, processing and distribution
of narcotics by 50%. In order to achieve this goal, the Plan Colombia included several cam-
paigns to destroy the production and processing of cocaine that included aerial spraying,
manual eradication and control of chemical precursors used in the production of cocaine,
the detection and destruction of cocaine processing laboratories, and seizing of drug ship-
ments en route to other countries (Mejia et al., 2015). According to these authors, aerial
spraying has been the main anti-drug strategy with approximately 128 thousand hectares
being sprayed per year. More precisely, approximately a third of total coca cultivation and
half of overall aerial spraying in Colombia between 2000 and 2010 had taken place in the
departments bordering Ecuador of Putumayo y Narin˜o. As a consequence, the implementa-
tion of the Plan Colombia inventively affected the internal stability and security of Colombia
through the intensification of the conflict as well as spillover effects neighboring countries
like Ecuador.
The Plan Colombia has been a source of stiff arguments and discrepancies in its effec-
tiveness to achieve peace and combat drug trafficking in the region. The Plan Colombia has
not been cheap and the U.S. alone allocated $8 billion for its implementation between 2000
and 2012 (Beittel, 2011). Even though during this period the strategy was able to reduce
by 50% the area of coca leaf cultivation, it was not able to reduce amount of coca leaf pro-
duction itself (Gerson and Perez, 2012; Mejia and Posada, 2008; Mejia and Restrepo, 2013;
Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003; Reyes, 2014)2. Moreover, Mejia et al. (2015) investigated the
deterrent effects of the aerial spraying program and conclude that spraying one additional
1The comprehensive strategy was designed to address five areas of action: (1) development of productive
processes; (2) protection and promotion of human capital and humanitarian assistance; (3) institutional
development and strengthening of social capital; (4) construction of an infrastructure for peace; (5) and
promotion of a sustainable environment.
2For example, Reyes (2014) showed that a 1% increase in eradication of coca lead to approximately a
1% increase in coca cultivation.
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hectare reduces coca leaf cultivation by about 0.2 to 0.65 hectares. However, the same au-
thors estimated that a reduction in the cultivation area through aerial spraying by of 1% (800
hectares) has a cost to the U.S. taxpayers of 9.24−30 million dollars per year, would only
reduce the supply of cocaine in the U.S. by 0.004%, or the equivalent to 20kg. On the other
hand, other authors label the Plan Colombia “an extremely effective strategy” weighted by
its success to reduce in half the effective forces of the FARC, reduction in crime and violence
(Beittel, 2011). Despite the evidence provided for both sides of the arguments, it is evident
that the implementation of the Plan Colombia had a disparate toll on the civilian popula-
tion with approximately 7 million displaced individuals since records began (See Table 1) 3.
In addition to the local repercussions from the implementation of the Plan Colombia, this
strategy has also caused an uproar in the bordering countries, particularly in Ecuador.
The spillover effects from the Plan Colombia were quickly felt in southern neighboring
Ecuador. As a consequence from intensification of the conflict derived from the implemen-
tation of the Plan Colombia, there has been a great pressure in the social, economic and
governmental infrastructure of Ecuador’s bordering provinces with Colombia. A great con-
cern has been placed on the shift of illegal activities and violence into Ecuador’s bordering
provinces. In particular, there has been a shift in production and distribution of cocaine
to Ecuador, increasing presence of illegal Colombian armed groups as well as economic and
productive damages in the Ecuadorian bordering regions. In a recent report by Ecuador’s
Attorney General reveals the extent to which the production and distribution of cocaine
has been diverted to Ecuador’s national territory in particular to the provinces of Carchi,
Esmeraldas and Sucumbios (FGE, 2014). For example, the document cites that in August
3On this topic, there are some interesting works that analyzed the causes and consequences of displace-
ment in Colombia. Iba´n˜ez and Ve´lez (2008) estimated that the welfare losses of displacement are about
37% of the net present value of rural lifetime aggregate consumption. Iba´n˜ez and Moya (2010) studied the
magnitude of the changes in consumption and labor income after forced migration. The authors found huge
drops in consumption and labor income but also asset losses and harsh conditions in destination cities, and
the breaking of risk-sharing mechanisms.
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Table 1: Total of people internally displaced in Colombia as a consequence of the armed conflict (in thou-
sands)
People People People
Displaced Received Declared Displaced
Before 1999 996.72 736.151 892.509
1999 229.924 193.313 48.427
2000 477.718 509.323 321.22
2001 576.85 581.047 425.455
2002 677.348 658.977 511.105
2003 397.115 388.841 264.798
2004 365.896 364.098 247.614
2005 414.427 414.39 303.528
2006 409.964 418.252 363.567
2007 439.225 449.589 444.915
2008 394.729 419.534 490.448
2009 223.928 248.399 404.414
2010 166.804 184.362 345.74
2011 204.097 218.831 413.903
2012 213.606 223.872 491.383
2013 211.92 224.778 673.537
2014 150.753 164.912 638.302
Total 6551.024 6398.669 7280.865
Source: Consultor´ıa para los Derechos Humanos y el De-
splazamiento (CODHES). Estad´ısticas Historicas de De-
splazamiento.
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2012 alone a joint police operation between Ecuadorian and Colombian policy forces dis-
mantled seven cocaine laboratories in Esmeraldas, Ecuador. On the other hand, it has been
documented that irregular armed groups, such as FARC, paramilitaries and criminal gangs
have been increasing their presence in Ecuador. FGE (2014) cites a number of incursions
by the Aguilas Negras and Los Uraben˜os4 in the provinces of Esmeraldas and Carchi where
they presumable are currently operating. The spread of such illegal groups has been possible
thanks to the weak presence of the Ecuadorian government in such areas.
Moreover, Ecuador began to experience an influx of internally displaced individuals seek-
ing refugee from the armed conflict. In the year 2000, Ecuador had registered 390 individuals
recognized as refugees by the Ecuadorian government. Today, by all estimated, Ecuador hosts
the largest refugee population in Latin America, with mately 55,000 refugees officially rec-
ognized by the Ecuadorian government as of September, 2013 of which 98% are Colombian
citizens (ACNUR, 2015). Nevertheless, and despite the fact that up to August, 2012 there
were 108 (0.19%) individuals with refugee status incarcerated out of approximately 55,000
total refugees, the perception among the public and governmental authorities has linked the
influx of refugees with the apparent increase in violent crimes.
Additionally, the economic spillovers from implementing the Plan Colombia have also
been felt in the bordering provinces of Ecuador. The losses incurred by the Ecuadorian
government from the traffic of fuel to supply the armed forces and drug traffickers are in the
millions and in occasions cause disruptions in the local markets. Moreover, the aerial spray-
ing has been conducted using Glyphosate mixed with Cosmoflux, which is a substance whose
health and environmental effects are still unknown. Ultimately the Ecuadorian government
sued Colombia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2008 where it alleged that
4These are organized gangs that control fluvial routes in the border provinces between Ecuador and
Colombia for cocaine transportation and distribution.
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aerial spraying by Colombia of toxic herbicides at locations near, at and across its border
with Ecuador. Nevertheless, the health and economic effects on farmers from aerial spraying
has been well debated and documented by Ecuadorian farmers who claim substantial losses
in crops and livestock (Camacho and Mej´ıa, 2013). It is worth reminding that the bordering
provinces presented the worst socio-economic conditions compared to the rest of the country
well before the implementation of the Plan Colombia. More recently, the incidence of poverty
by 2010 in Esmeraldas, Sucumbios and Carchi was of 50%, 52% and 40% respectively while
the national level was estimated to be significantly below at approximately 23% (FGE, 2014).
Summarizing, the plan Colombia had various spillover effects into Ecuador. However, in
this paper we specifically focus on two: (1) the increased level of insecurity as a result of
the intensification of the conflict; (2) The growing number of asylum seekers and refugees,
which are seen as crime prone in the bordering regions.
3. Data, Econometric Strategy and Results
We assess whether the bordering Ecuadorian provinces saw an increase in violence, mea-
sured by homicides, after the implementation of the plan Colombia. To do so, we employ a
simple difference in difference approach. We compare the murder rates before and after the
implementation of such programme between the ”treated” bordering versus the ”not treated”
non bordering ones. We created an innovative panel data for Ecuador at the provincial level
for the period 1997-2012. We considered 20 provinces, rather than the actual 24. This is
because three provinces were created after 1998 and we decided to attribute their values to
the original provinces in order to have comparable series. Moreover, we dropped Galapagos
given its extreme distance from the mainland. Data on homicides have been taken from
the annual statistics on “Deaths and Births” (Estad´ısticas de Nacimientos y Defunciones)
published by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. The data set records the
cause of death as registered in the death certificate as signed by the medical examiner. Due
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to lack of data, we believe that this is the best measurement of violence we could get at the
provincial level for such a long period. Again, it is worth reminding that homicides is just one
of the proxies of violence. Unfortunately, we do not have any data on these other dimensions.
In Figure 2, we considered the homicide rates for the three bordering provinces versus
the no bordering ones for all the years of the panel. We drew a line for the official start of
the Plan Colombia , 1999, and also the effective implementation, 2000 5. As we can see,
the rates are much higher for the provinces close to Colombia compared to the others, well
before the official start of the Plan. After that, the same provinces do not exhibit a much
different trend compared to the untreated ones. There is an apparent spike in the very first
year after its implementation, 2000, but in the following years the two time series appear to
be strongly correlated.
Figure 2: Homicide Rates in Bordering and Non-Bordering Provinces
5As we already said, the plan was signed by the end of 1999.
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Formally, the difference in difference model we are testing is :
MurderRatesi,t =β0 + β1Bordi + β2PCt+
β3Bordi × PCt + β4 · t+ εi,t
where MurderRatesi,t is the murder rate for the province i and year t; Bord is a dummy
equal to one for each of the three bordering provinces (i.e. Esmeraldas , Carchi and Su-
cumbios); PCt captures the years in which the Plan Colombia was taking place and is equal
to one from 2001 until time t, and zero before that; Bordi × PCt is an interaction term
between the previous two variables, which captures the effect of the implementation of the
Plan Colombia (measured as the murder rate) on the bordering province i. Consequently,
the coefficient of interest from Equation (1) is β3. By closely analyzing Figure 2, at first
sight it suggests that there is very little or no effect at all. Finally, the terms β4 · t is designed
to capture the common inter-temporal shocks to all provinces.
In Table 2 we show the empirical results after estimating Equation (1). From Table 2
column I is model (1) as described in Equation (1). The coefficient Bordi is positive and very
significant, which indicate that provinces at the border have higher murder rates compared
to non bordering ones. The coefficient associated with the Plan Colombian, PCt, is positive
and significant. Similarly, the coefficient of interest, β3 , is also positive but highly insignifi-
cant. This result let us to believe that the Plan Colombia did not increase the murder rates
in the bordering provinces. In column II, we include the set of controls to Equation (1). The
results for Bordi are very similar to the previous ones. However, now the coefficient PCt is
not statistically different from zero. We suspect that in column I the coefficient PCt was
capturing some other effects we did not control for and that are specific to each province.
Thus, Table 2 column II includes a series of control variables, but again the coefficient of
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interest β3 is not significant. On the other hand, in Table 2 column III we decided to include
an interaction term between the bordering provinces with each year after the Plan Colombia
was implemented. By doing this our aim is to assess the impact of Plan Colombia in each
year but, again, none of these interactions is significant.
Moreover, the (perceived) increased level of insecurity in the bordering provinces has led
the Ecuadorian government to take actions to face the challenges arising from the spillovers
from the internal conflict in Colombia. As a consequence, the government of president Rafael
Correa decided to implement a strategy in order to counteract the detrimental social and
economic effects from the conflict in efforts to increase the security among the bordering
provinces. This strategy is the so-called “Plan Ecuador” and it consisted of three main
pillars: (1) to consolidate the security, a culture of peace centered on the human being,
satisfying their needs and enhancing their capabilities and freedoms; (2) maintain a policy
of equitable and supportive international relations; (3) assert a defense policy based on pro-
tection of the population, natural resources, national heritage and effective control of the
territory. In summary, the Plan Ecuador was designed in an effort to address the multidi-
mensional and multi-sectoral impacts of the internal conflict of Colombia in the bordering
regions of Ecuador. The Plan Ecuador had a number of plans to strengthen the economy
of the the bordering provinces of Esmeraldas, Sucumbios and Carchi as well as Imbabura
and Orellana given their proximity to the northern border. In addition, this policy also
had aimed at increasing the number of military and police force in the bordering regions as
a strategy6 to increase the level of security along these provinces7.Consequenty, the imple-
mentation of the plan Ecuador could create identification issues because these two policies
6This consisted in upgrading the presence of troops, air planes and helicopters in the most vulnerable
areas. Moreover, other violent-reducing policies have been implemented, such as the prohibition to carry
small weapons.
7We have dedicated a great level of effort in trying to obtain specific statistics on the distribution and
number of military and policy forces for this policy. However, the ministry of defense categorically denied
our request for data arguing that it was a matter of national security.
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could work one against the other. To rule out such possibility, we considered only the period
before the implementation of Plan Ecuador, i.e. 2008. The results of this exercise can be
seen in Table 2 column IV. Again, we do not find any significant difference in the homicide
rates between bordering and non bordering provinces after the implementation of the Plan
Colombia. Interestingly, the coefficient PCt, is now positive and strongly significant. More-
over, the ”spillover” effects could extend not only to the three bordering provinces but also
to Imbabura, which is also very close to the border with Colombia. In Table 2 column V,
we estimate model (1) with 4 bordering provinces instead of three8, but we are unable to
determine any causal effect and the same conclusion remain. Continuing, we also consider
five ” treated” provinces , including also Napo9, as bordering provinces. As before, β3 is not
significant.
In the crime literature, it is well known that homicide rates are very volatile. Therefore,
in column VII we divide the whole panel , a total of 16 years, into five periods, one before and
four after 2000, and calculated the average murder rate. In Table 3 column VII we considered
three periods (1997-1999 and two after) and also calculated the murder rates. The results,
in Table 3, show that for none of these specifications, the plan Colombia saw an increase in
violence in the bordering provinces. We also considered year to year murder growth rates,in
column VIII. As we already mentioned in Section 2, the plan Colombia formally started in
1999 but the policy actually took effect in 2000. Just to be on the safe side, we ”postponed”
the start date of the Plan to 2001. From Table 3 column X shows the results for this exer-
cise. Again, none of the regressions has a significant impact on the homicides rates. Finally,
we do not include the time dummies (Table 3 column XI) but the effect is still not significant.
8We include Imbabura as a possible bordering province given its proximity of two hours drive from the
border to the largest city in the province (Ibarra).
9Which also includes Orellana.
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Table 2: Impact of Plan Colombia on Homicides Rates in Ecuadorian Provinces (Part I)
Basic Basic + Interaction Before Four Five
Controls w/ Time 2008 Provinces Provinces
I II III IV V VI
Bord X PC 4.495 4.885 8.876
[4.866] [5.519] [7.216]
Bord 4 X PC 3.215
[4.516]
Bord 5 X PC 2.565
[3.780]
Bord X 2000 3.278
[4.474]
Bord X 2001 2.613
[5.999]
Bord X 2002 12.645
[11.314]
Bord X 2003 4.423
[5.660]
Bord X 2004 2.429
[6.027]
Bord X 2005 2.505
[5.867]
Bord X 2006 3.087
[4.911]
Bord X 2007 4.586
[6.949]
Bord X 2008 9.982
[6.901]
Bord X 2009 5.169
[6.077]
Bord X 2010 5.357
[6.104]
Bord X 2011 5.761
[4.700]
Bord X 2012 1.746
[5.044]
Bord 14.435** 12.201* 12.179* 8.573*
[4.994] [5.365] [5.465] [3.569]
Bord 4 8.587
[4.541]
Bord 5 6.684
[4.700]
Plan Colombia -3.556* 0.293 0.587 12.412** 0.325 0.863
[1.386] [1.141] [1.126] [1.275] [1.220] [2.462]
Observations 320 320 320 260 320 320
R-squared 0.363 0.609 0.617 0.615 0.532 0.476
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ***: Significant at the 1% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; *: Significant at the 10%
level. This table reports the the difference in difference results that evaluate the impact of the
Plan Colombia on the level of homicide rates on Ecuadorian provinces. Data are from 1997 until
2012. The dependent variable is the provincial homicide rates. Bord is a dummy equal one if the
province is either Sucumbios, Carchi or Esmeraldas. Plan Colombia or PC is a dummy equal to one
from 2000 onward and 0 before. All the regressions, but column I, include the following controls:
the percentage of young people, male and the interaction between these two on total provincial
population; the density of population ; a proxy of the GDP, as explained in the text.
4. Impact of Colombian Migration on Crime Rates in Ecuador
To evaluate the impact of migration on homicide rates in Ecuador we consider a shorter
version of the panel employed in the difference in difference specification. As main regressors
we consider the total stock of asylum seekers, and refugees, weighted by provincial popula-
tion. The difference between the two is that asylum seekers consider all applicants to asylum
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Table 3: Impact of Plan Colombia on Homicides Rates in Ecuadorian Provinces ( Part II)
Five Periods Three Periods One Yr Plan 2001 No Time
Average Average Growth Dummies
VII VIII IX X XI
Bord X PC 7.207 6.507 12.823 4.9
[6.664] [5.851] [22.243] [5.414]
Bord 9.410* 9.388** -40.656 13.011* 12.058*
[3.897] [3.091] [42.882] [6.038] [5.103]
Plan Colombia 4.507** 4.259** 9.154 2.881**
[0.906] [0.557] [36.966] [0.740]
Plan Colombia 2001 0.346
[1.782]
Observations 100 60 300 320 320
R-squared 0.655 0.679 0.196 0.609 0.596
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ***: Significant at the 1% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; *: Significant at the 10%
level. This table reports the the difference in difference results that evaluate the impact of the
Plan Colombia on the level of homicide rates on Ecuadorian provinces. Data are from 1997 until
2012. The dependent variable is the provincial homicide rates. Bord is a dummy equal one if the
province is either Sucumbios, Carchi or Esmeraldas. Plan Colombia or PC is a dummy equal to one
from 2000 onward and 0 before (except column X). In column VII, we collapsed the 16 year time
span into five periods and calculated the average murder rates. In column VIII, we considered the
average for three periods: one before the plan Colombia (1997-1999) and two after. In column IX
we calculate year to year annual growth. Column X reports the same results as II, but the staring
period of Plan Colombia is now 2001, rather 2000. The last column is the standard specification
without time dummies. All the regressions include the following controls: the percentage of young
people, male and the interaction between these two on total provincial population; the density of
population ; a proxy of the GDP, as explained in the text.
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whereas refugees are only the successful ones. We have data on the country of origins of
these people, but only at a national, rather than at the provincial level. This data are taken
from the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) which has kindly provided them to
us. As we can see in the Figure 3 below, there were very few migrants until the year 2001
and then this number suddenly increased and kept rising until 2009. The big majority of
them were Colombians, as already documented in section 2.
Figure 3: Number of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Ecuador for the period 1997-2012
Our analysis fits into a growing literature that studies the impact of migration on crime,
although mainly based on developed countries. Among them, the most relevant ones are:
Bianchi et al. (2012); Bell and Machin (2013), Bell et al. (2013). The first investigated the
impact of immigration on crime across Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003. They
used an instrumental variable approach and found no effect of migration on any type of
crime, except on robberies. Bell et al. (2013) analyzed the relationship between crime and
migration for the UK from 1971 until 2001 at the neighborhood level. The authors employed
an index score for crime along with various measures of crime taken from the British Crime
Survey (BCS). They found a negative effect of migration on crime with the crime scores,
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whereas the results with the BCS showed no relationship between migration and violent
crime. Bell et al. (2013), the closest to ours, considered the impact of two migration waves
on crime rates for the UK in the 2000s. The first wave was composed by asylum seekers
and the second one started in 2004, when eight new countries joined the European Union.
Neither waves had an impact on violent crime. However, asylum seekers had a positive and
significant effect on property crime and the European wave had a negative and significant
effect on property ones.
A geographical inspection of our data show that migrants were initially concentrated in
the bordering province of Sucumbios10. Over the years, the wave of refugees has progressively
spread across all three bordering provinces (Esmeraldas, Carchi and Sucumbios), as well as
to other provinces relatively close to the border such as Imbabura and Pichincha, the latter
corresponds to the the province where Quito, the capital of Ecuador is located11. Therefore,
the ”treated” regions extend the three bordering ones we considered earlier. Moreover, with
such data we can assess the intensity of the spillover effects. There are still reasons to
suspect that our explanatory migration variable is endogenous. This happens because of the
presence of unobserved time-varying variables which can both affect migration decision and
crime levels. Furthermore, Bell et al. (2013) suggested that, if immigrants decide to move to
areas which are experiencing a decline in crime, this would also bias downward the coefficient.
We solve the endogeneity by instrumenting migration in a similar fashion as Angrist and
Kugler (2003) that considered migration from former Yugoslavia. This instrument is given
by a national time series part and a cross sectional one. The former is the intensity of
Plan Colombia because a progressive implementation of the plan lead to more conflict in the
”coca” areas and more displaced people that went South. The cross sectional part is made
of the inverse of the average distance from the three borders. Formally, we have:
10Map not shown but available on request.
11Both Imbabura and Pichincha are within two and four hours driving from the closest border with
Colombia.
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Instrumenti,t =
1
AvgDistancei
× Intensity of PCt (1)
We used various measure which represents the intensity of the Plan Colombia. The first
one is Aereal Fumigation which is the total number of hectares which have been fumigated
in Colombia weighted by the total number of hectares cultivated with coca for all Colom-
bia. Manual Fumigation represents the rate of hectares of coca plants manually eradicated
over the total number of hectares cultivated with coca. We also consider the total number
of hectares manually eradicated plus fumigated weighted by the total number of hectares
cultivated with coca for all Colombia, Aerial and Manual. Coca Seizure represents the total
kilograms of coca seized divided by the total number of hectares cultivated with coca for all
Colombia. Laboratories represents the number of coca laboratories destroyed. Finally, All
is an over-identified model that includes Aerial and Manual, Coca Seizure and Laboratories.
We multiplied the intensity of the Plan Colombia by the inverse of the average distance
to the three t boarders, one for each province, in km. Provinces which are closer to the
Colombian borders are likely to attract more immigrants. The inverse measure ensures us
to have a potential positive relation. Therefore, we have the following structural and first
stage equations:
MurderRateit = αit + γ ̂Migrationit + γXit + ζi + θt + εit (2)
̂Migrationit = αit + ρInstrumentit + γXit + ζi + θt + εit (3)
The results of this instrumental variable exercise can be seen in Table 4. The coefficient
of the first stage are always positive and highly significant. Indeed, migrants are more likely
to arrive when the intensity of the Plan Colombia, i.e. intensity of conflict, is high and
the province is close to the border. Moreover, the R-squared is quite high, well above 0.5
for all the specifications. The F-statistic are higher than the rule of thumb value of 10.
The second stage results show that the coefficient is always negative and significant. An
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increase in migrants in a province is associated with a decrease in the homicide rates. We
find that these findings are robust to the use of different instruments and for just identified
and over-identified model (last column). These results are similar to the ones found by the
previous literature. When we use an over identified model, we are also able to check the
validity of the instruments. The test show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all
the instruments are valid. We conclude that the over identifying restriction is correct.
5. Conclusions
Plan Colombia is a multilateral strategy between the US and Colombia to fight, among
other things, illegal drugs in Colombia. Such plan also produced spillover effects on neighbor
countries, especially Ecuador. For example, it has shifted coca cultivation in the northern
Ecuadorian provinces, along with the presence of guerilla members. In general, it increased
the perception of insecurity in the three bordering provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi and
Sucumbios. Despite this policy relevance, there are not quantitative studies that analyzed
whether, and to which extent, the implementation of the plan impacted on the level of vi-
olence in such bordering provinces. We fill such gap by using a newly created panel data
at the provincial level for the period 1997-2012. As a dependent variable we use provincial
homicide rates, the only available conflict-related variable. Indeed, we are aware that this
is just one of the possible dimensions of violence. As estimation technique, we employed
a simple difference in difference approach. Surprisingly, the results do not show a statisti-
cally significant increase in the homicide rates in such provinces compared to non-bordering
provinces. This result is robust to different specifications such as averaging homicide rates
for various time periods and calculating growth rates. Moreover, we recognize that the ap-
plication of the so-called Plan Ecuador might invalidate the results. Therefore, we consider
only the period before 2008. Again, we do not find any statistically significant effect of such
plan on the level of violence.
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As a next step, we evaluate whether Colombian migration in Ecuador, another conse-
quences of the Plan Colombia in Ecuador, on the level of violence in Ecuadorian provinces.
Given the likley endogeneity of the migration variable, we employ an instrumental variable
approach. As an instrument we multiply the inverse of the average distance from the three
borders by various measures of the intensity of the Plan Colombia. These include areal and
manual fumigation, total quantity of coca seized and destroyed coca laboratories . The idea
of using such unstrument is that, as the plan intensified, more and more people migrated
south to escape violence in Colombia, especially to neighboring provinces. First stage results
show a strong relevance condition. Most importantly, we are confident that the exclusion
restriction applies in such case because we already found that the Plan Colombia did not in-
crease violence in the bordering provinces. Our results highlight that migration, if anything,
lead to a small reduction of homicide rates, even though the effect is very small. The results
are robust across all the specifications.
We conclude that probably the perception of the crime/violence-related consequences
of the Plan Colombia on Ecuador are considerably exaggerated. However, this judgment
depends heavily on the lack of available data, which do not allow us to assess whether other
forms of conflict significantly increased in the bordering provinces compared to non bordering
provinces. Future research should be aimed at considering such other measures and also use
geo-referenced data that would allow a more precise spatial analysis of spillovers.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Homicide Rates 320 13.04992 11.20388 0 67.25546
Car 320 549.6294 495.9582 0.968683 2488.736
Density of Population 320 67.95146 56.04677 1.942378 245.7997
Male Population 320 50.2957 2.110669 45.49681 56.05391
Young Population 320 27.0948 1.897081 12.61917 31.90259
Male*Young Population 320 1364.133 128.0209 622.3034 1722.189
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